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Abstract
This paper examines a simple and practical security preprocessing scheme for the Gaussian wiretap channel. A
security gap based error rate is used as a measure of security over the wire-tap channel. In previous works, information
puncturing and scrambling schemes based on low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes were employed to reduce the
security gap. Unlike the previous works, our goal is to improve security performance by using the precode of the
feed-forward (FF) structure. We demonstrate that the FF code has an advantage for the security gap compared to the
perfect scrambling scheme. Furthermore, we propose the joint iterative decoding method between LDPC and FF
codes to improve the reliability/security performances. The proposed joint iterative method is able to achieve
outstanding performance by using the proposed scaling and correction factors based on signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
evolution. The improved performances by these factors are demonstrated through the extrinsic information transfer
(EXIT) chart and simulation results. Finally, the simulation results suggest that the proposed coding scheme is more
effective than the conventional scrambling scheme.
Keywords: Feed-forward, Pre-code, LDPC code, BCJR algorithm, Physical layer security, Wiretap channel, Scrambling,
Security gap, Joint iterative decoding, EXIT chart
1 Introduction
For several decades, wireless communication technologies
have been available that exchange information rapidly and
reliably between a sender and a receiver. Owing to the
continued development of communication technologies,
we can today access communication networks conve-
niently and with transportability, whenever and wherever
we wish. In conjunction with this development, a growing
interest has developed in secure information transmission
over wireless networks related to the specific security vul-
nerabilities caused by the inherent openness of wireless
media. It is difficult to detect eavesdropping because any-
body can acquire transmitted information over a wireless
communication channel.
Shannon established communication theory in 1949
and defined the basic concept of secure communica-
tion from the information-theoretic perspective [1]. Using
Shannon’s approaches, a sender, Alice, securely transmits
an information message M to a legitimate receiver, Bob,
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across a public channel. To be “perfectly secure", the
requirement of the mutual information I(M;X) = 0 must
be satisfied between Alice’s information message M and
the transmitted word X. From this definition, Shannon
proved that Alice and Bob must share a key string to
achieve perfect security. This theory was the introduction
of the key distribution problem and is the basis of sym-
metric key cryptography defense systems for the upper
layer implemented today. Present systems based on cryp-
tography prevent the extraction of information without
a secure key string when information is exposed to the
eavesdropper Eve. This public key algorithm depends on
the computational limit of the eavesdropper to ensure
computational security. In spite of the improvements in
public key algorithms, there remains a problem for secu-
rity based on the assumption of Eve’s limited computa-
tional resources considering the advancement of available
computing power.
An alternative technology that is not based on compu-
tational complexity, is physical layer security. Unlike the
key distribution problem, physical layer security utilizes
the characteristics of a communication channel and allows
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a legitimate receiver to decode correctly. The impor-
tant difference compared to Shannon’s theory is that
the eavesdropper can observe information transmitted by
the sender through another channel. Physical layer secu-
rity guarantees security analytically, based on information
theory, regardless of the eavesdropper’s computational
power. Therefore, there is no elevation of risk due to the
advancement of high speed computing.
A security system based on the physical layer was intro-
duced byWyner in 1975 [2] and information-theoretically
secure communication was studied in [3, 4]. According to
the wiretap channel model defined by Wyner, the main
channel was defined between the sender, Alice, and the
legitimate receiver, Bob; the wiretap channel was defined
as a degraded version of the main channel. The main
and wiretap channels were assumed to be discrete mem-
oryless channels. Suppose that Alice sends Bob an s-bit
message M across the main channel. Alice encodes M
into an n-bit transmitted word X. Bob and Eve receive
message X across the main and wiretap channel, respec-
tively. Bob and Eve’s channel observations are denoted
by Y and Z, respectively. Alice encodes the information
for two objectives [2] as follows: (i) the error probabil-
ity between the message M and Bob’s decoded message
MˆB of the received message Y must converge to zero
(with negligibly small probability of error) [reliability]. ii)
no information is shared between information messageM
and Eve’s received message Z. For a precise expression,
the formulation is articulated as the rate of mutual infor-
mation 1n I(M;Z) → 0 when n → ∞ [security]. Wyner
defined that physical layer security is achieved without key
distribution using forward error correction (FEC) when it
corresponds to the considerations of reliability and secu-
rity. Moreover, the secrecy rate is defined by the rate s/n,
where s and n are the number of secret message bits and
the number of bits transmitted over the channel, respec-
tively. A detailed explanation of Wyner code could be
found in [5].
Cheong generalized the Gaussian wiretap channel [6]
based on Wyner’s wiretap channel model as illustrated
in Fig. 1. Wyner showed that if the wiretap channel is a
degraded version of the main channel then secrecy capac-
ity is positive. In [4], the authors showed that the secrecy
capacity is positive when the main channel is “less noisy”
than the wiretap channel such as σ 2B≤ σ 2E (corollary 3
in [4]). Then, Bob’s received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)(
P/σ 2B
)





Several security measurement metrics for physical layer
security are used for evaluating transmissions over the
wiretap channel. These security metrics depend on the
characteristic of the coding scheme used for transmis-
sions. Among the metrics, bit error rate (BER) can be
a practical metric as a security measure when modu-
lation and coding schemes (MCS) are considered in a
Fig. 1 Block diagram of a Gaussian wiretap channel
practical system [7, 8]. Therefore, since the BER metric
allows for easy measurement and straightforward assess-
ment, in this paper, we focus on the BER security met-
ric. Another useful metric to measure the security is
the equivocation rate analysis by information-theoretic
security on the secret message [9–11]. The information
theoretic approach could be developed, since BER met-
ric could not provide the same amount of information
for the information theoretic approach and guarantee per-
fect secrecy. However, it is out of scope of this paper.
The BER of approximately 0.5 of Eve’s decoded message
MˆE with random noise does not guarantee that she will
not be able to obtain sufficient information on the trans-
mitted message. Security measurement using BER was
introduced by Klinc et al. and is called “security gap”. Secu-
rity gap is defined as the difference between Bob and Eve’s
received SNR and can be used to achieve physical layer
security. It is assumed that Bob’s received SNR is greater
than Eve’s. To achieve physical layer security for the same
received messages, an average BER over Eve’s channel,
PEe must approach 0.5 and an average BER over Bob’s,
PBe must approach zero. Thus, the reliability and security
conditions are as follows:
(a) Reliability : PBe ≤ PBe,max;
(b) Security : PEe ≥ PEe,min,
where PBe,max and PEe,min are the BER thresholds for reliabil-
ity and security, respectively. Bob’s near-zero BER implies
a negligibly small probability of error in a practical system
and Eve’s BER around 0.5 implies that half of the informa-
tion is corrupted by channel noise. Therefore, PBe,max and
PEe,min as BER thresholds are defined by BER 10−5 and 0.4
in this paper. Thus, the security gap can be expressed in
terms of the SNR as follows [7]:
SG(security gap) = SNRB,minSNRE,max , (1)
where SNRB,min is the lowest SNR for which (a) is satisfied
and SNRE,max is the highest SNR for which (b) holds.
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According to (1), the security gap should be kept as
small as possible, so that the desired security is achieved
with small degradation of Eve’s channel. Therefore, it is
important to construct an error-correcting code (ECC) to
reduce the security gap. As mentioned above, the main
target of this paper is to keep the security gap as small as
possible.
Studies on the error-correcting code for physical
layer security have focused on low-density parity-check
(LDPC) codes. LDPC codes [12] have a remarkable
error-correcting capability and a powerful analysis tool
for a belief propagation (BP) decoder, [13] called den-
sity evolution (DE) [14] or the extrinsic information
transfer (EXIT) chart [15]. Klinc et al. [7] proposed a
security-achieving algorithm using LDPC codes with
a puncturing scheme. Only parity bits are transmitted
to eliminate the exposure of secret messages and the
decoders recover the punctured bits using the received
parity bits. Baldi proposed non-systematic codes [16, 17]
for physical layer security using a scrambling matrix
inspired by the McEliece Cryptosystem [18]. This
scheme causes intentional bit error propagation where
transmitted bits consist of scrambled information bits.
This achieves secrecy maintaining the error correc-
tion capability of FEC and the advantage of a decrease
in the signal power compared with the puncturing
scheme [19]. However, since the scrambling scheme
produced leads to an error propagation phenomenon, an
improved reliability in terms of frame error rate cannot be
expected.
In this paper, we propose a feed-forward (FF) pre-code
that resolves the disadvantage of the puncturing scheme
for linear block codes and addresses the advantage of a
decrease in the signal power with respect to the conven-
tional scrambling scheme. Unlike the previous scrambling
scheme that uses a hard decision value for error propaga-
tion only, the proposed code has an improved reliability at
a high SNR region compared to the scrambling scheme.
We demonstrate that the proposed code has improved
reliability performance at high SNR with a reduced secu-
rity gap. The proposed system consists of an LDPC code
as an inner code and an FF code as a pre-code (outer
code). The outer code has a code rate approaching one to
minimize the loss of transmitted information against the
conventional scrambling scheme. By concatenating LDPC
and FF codes, reliability is achieved using LDPC and secu-
rity is realized using the FF code. Unlike the scrambling
scheme, the FF code employs soft decision decoding to
recover the secret message and has superior reliability
performance compared to the scrambling scheme. The
reliability performance can be improved by applying joint
iterative decoding to the proposed system. The improved
performance is demonstrated through the EXIT chart
curves [20–22].
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2,
we introduce the wiretap channel model and review pre-
vious works, information puncturing, and scrambling
schemes. In Section 3, the encoding and decoding proce-
dures of the FF code are discussed and the performance
is evaluated. In Section 4, the joint iterative decoding
procedure is explained and the security and reliabil-
ity performances of the proposed system are evaluated.
Also, we approximate the factors used in this paper and
analyze the performance of the proposed system using
the EXIT chart curve. The conclusion is presented in
Section 5.
2 Preliminaries and related works
This section discusses some background concepts and the
previous works that will be used throughout the paper.
2.1 Systemmodel
Alice sends an n-bit transmitted sequenceXn ∈ {x1, x2, · · · ,
xn} after encoding a k-bit pre-coded message Mk ∈
{m1,m2, · · · ,mk} (Mk is the pre-coded message of the
s-bit secret message Us ∈ {u1, · · · ,us}). The received
sequences of Bob and Eve are denoted as Yn and Zn,
respectively. Alice sends message X using binary phase-
shift keying (BPSK) modulation. The Gaussian wiretap
channel model can then be generalized [9, 10] as follows:
Yi = Xi + NBobi
Zi = κXi + NEvei
(2)
where NBobi and NEvei are independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d) zero-mean Gaussian random variables of
variance σ 2B and σ 2E , respectively, and κ is a positive con-
stant that models the gain advantage of the eavesdropper
over the destination.
Let nch be the number of transmitted bits over the chan-
nel, and ncode denote the codeword block length of the
LDPC code. Define the design rate Rd = knch , the secret
rate Rs = snch , and the code rate Rc = kncode . In general,if the number of the secret message bits s is equal to the
dimension of the LDPC code k, then Rs = Rd . If Rs < Rd
in [7], it may help to achieve the reduced security gap but
higher power should be needed to achieve the reliability
condition. Since the power saving is important in many
applications, Rs ≈ Rd is preferred.
2.2 Punctured and scrambled code for Gaussian wiretap
channel
In [7], D.Klinc et al. proposed punctured LDPC codes
to achieve security over the Gaussian wiretap channel.
The punctured LDPC codes are employed to remove the
exposure of the secret message to Eve. The puncturing
fraction is denoted by p, which implies the fraction of
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the punctured secret message. To construct the Rs = Rd
code, the mother code with rate Rc = p < 0.5 must
be used, since the secret rate Rs = p/(1 − p). The
authors of [7, 8] demonstrated that the punctured code
can remarkably reduce the security gap compared with the
non-punctured code. However, the punctured code has
less reliable performance than the non-punctured code
and requires higher power to achieve good performance
over the main channel. To overcome these vulnerabili-
ties, non-systematic codes using scrambling schemes were
proposed by Baldi et al. [16, 17]. In the scrambling scheme,
Alice generates the pre-coded message m by multiply-
ing the secret message vector u and scrambling matrix
S. Alice then sends the encoded message x by a product
of the pre-coded message m = u · S and the generator
matrix G to Bob. The scrambling procedure transforms
the systematic code to the non-systematic code. Unlike
the previous puncturing scheme, the scrambling scheme
maintains that the secret and code rates are equal, that is
Rs = Rc, and the scheme requires the same signal power
to achieve reliability. The expression of scrambling can be
written as
x = u · S · G = m · G.
A 1×n pre-coded codeword x is generated by multiply-
ing a k×n generatormatrixG and 1×k pre-codedmessage
m constructed by multiplying a 1 × k secret message u
and a k× k scrambling matrix S. Figure 2 illustrates a sim-
ple example of the puncturing and scrambling schemes.
The received signal is first decoded using the channel
decoder. The decoded message uˆ is solved through multi-
plication by the inverse scrambling (descrambling) matrix
S−1 and the decoded message m, and the expression of
descrambling can be written as
uˆ = (m + e) · S−1 = u · S · S−1 + e · S−1 = u + e · S−1
It is possible to recover the secret message with correct
decoding. However, if decoding fails, an error propaga-
tion phenomenon is observed due to the density of the
descrambling matrix S−1 in the right-side term of the
above equation. In [17], perfect scrambling is denoted by a
descramblingmatrix with row and columnweight> 1 and
a density close to 0.5. Thus, perfect scrambling with one
(or more) error(s) causes an error rate around 0.5 in the
final decoded message. Since the BER of Eve is very close
to 0.5 (if errors are randomly distributed), it would be
difficult to extract much information about the message.
In terms of the gain of signal power, Baldi et al. showed
that the puncturing scheme has worse error correcting
performance than the scrambling scheme with respect to
systematic LDPC coding. This is because the puncturing
scheme increases the code rate and has a negative impact
on the code minimum distance which is reduced [23, 24].
However, the scrambling scheme can only provide an
error propagation effect, not error correction. The use
of the scrambling scheme without FEC (as unitary rate
coding, section 3-A in [17]) guarantees security perfor-
mance on average, though it does not provide improved
reliability.
3 Feed-forward pre-code for physical layer
security
To achieve physical layer security with minimum loss of
code rate, the difference in the dimension between secret
and pre-coded messages must be minimized. This also
enables low complexity of the security processing. The
block diagram of the entire proposed system with the pre-
coded LDPC concatenation is illustrated in Fig. 3. The
sender (Alice) encodes the s-bit secret message U using
security preprocessing (FF encoder) and then encodes the
FF-coded message M into an n-bit codeword X. Bob and
Eve receive the message X across the main and wiretap
channel, respectively; then, using the received sequence
Fig. 2 Examples of an information puncturing and scrambling schemes
Kwon et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:283 Page 5 of 18
Fig. 3 Block diagram of the proposed system with the pre-coded LDPC concatenation over Gaussian wiretap channel
of Bob “Y ” and Eve “Z”, the decoded messages MˆB and
MˆE are achieved by performing their own LDPC decod-
ing procedure, respectively. The secret messages UˆB and
UˆE can be recovered via the FF decoder into the decoded
messages for Bob and Eve, respectively. In our simulations,
BPSK modulation {+1,−1} is employed and the code rate
of LDPC is 1/2. The number of transmitted bits is 960.
The FF decoder employs the Bahl-Cocke-Jelinek-Raviv
(BCJR) decoding algorithm for soft decision decoding.We
employ an LDPC code, as specified in the IEEE 802.16e
standard, in the proposed system for the following analysis
[25]. For LDPC decoding, the message-passing algorithm
in [13] is used. However, in this section, we only pro-
vide the encoding and decoding procedures of the FF
code as a pre-code and evaluate its reliability and security
performances.
The proposed coding scheme employs the simplest con-
volutional encoding with one tail bit to protect the secret
message for an improved reliability performance, and the
decoding complexity of the proposed scheme is higher
due to soft decision decoding (BCJR algorithm).
3.1 Encoding
Security processing with error propagation must be pro-
vided to achieve security. Thus, in this paper, we propose
the FF code as a pre-code, which is the inverse form of a
differential coding (DC) scheme. The proposed code has
low complexity and a feed-forward structure, not a recur-
sive form. Its generator polynomial is gFF(D) = 1+Dwith
a memory order of 1. Figure 4 presents the block diagram
of the FF encoder.
Fig. 4 Block diagram of feed-forward encoder
The FF encoder is a reversed form of the differential
encoder, i.e., the FF encoder and differential decoder con-
structions are the same structure. The matrix equation of
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and the pre-coded sequence mn can be directly expressed
as
mn = un−1 ⊕ un. (4)
Unlike the differential encoder, the output message of
the FF encoder consists of the modulo-2 addition between
the previous input symbol and the present input symbol.
The density of the descrambling matrixG−1FF is close to 0.5
due to the full upper triangular matrix. For arbitrary n, the
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On the case of binary phase shift keying (BPSK), the bit
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Therefore, an upper bound (UB) of FF hard decision





















The proposed code with density 0.5 guarantees the
requirement of perfect scrambling, and achieves the limit
of security performance when n goes to infinity. In con-
trast to the conventional scrambling scheme based on
a non-singular random matrix, the FF code consists
of the straightforward structures of the encoder and
decoder.
From [6], it is easily proved that the bit error probabil-
ity after FF hard decision decoding approaches half the
frame error probability, as in [16, 17]. Let j be the num-
ber of errors, Pj be the probability that a received n-bit
vector contains j errors before FF hard decision decoding,
mi be the ith error position in an n-bit string which con-
tains j errors, and ξj be the number of all possible cases
after FF hard decision decoding in the n-bit string which
contains j errors. e denotes the expectation value of the
number of errors after FF hard decision decoding. Under
such assumptions, the bit error probability after FF hard







































In Fig. 5, the BER performance of the FF hard deci-
sion decoding with the number of transmitted bits n =
10 is evaluated by the upper bound, error probability of
perfect scrambling, error probability of FF hard decision
decoding, and simulation. The upper bound and error
probabilities are computed from [7–9]. The simulation
results show that the performances of equations [7–9] are
very close to the simulation result. From the figure, the
performance and the descrambling density of the pro-
posed FF code are close to the conventional scrambling
scheme.
Fig. 5 Upper bound (7), perfect scrambling (8) and the analysis of FF hard decision decoding (9) with n = 10 bits
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3.2 Decoding
The inverse generator polynomial is g−1FF (D) = 11+D
because the pre-coded message Mˆ = (mˆ1, mˆ2, · · · , mˆn)
consists of the generator polynomial gFF(D) = 1 +
D. The FF decoder is a recursive form of the encoder.
Because of this construction, the FF-decoded message
Uˆ = (uˆ1, uˆ2, · · · , uˆn) has a regularity as follows:
uˆn = mˆn ⊕ uˆn−1. (11)
The recursive form of a decoder can continuously prop-
agate a bit error when an error occurs in the received
message. The construction of the FF code is based
on the convolutional code. Thus, the FF code can be
expressed using a trellis diagram. The FF code can be
decoded using a soft-input soft-output (SISO) decoder
or symbol-by-symbol maximum a posteriori (MAP) algo-
rithm. The representative MAP decoding algorithm is
the BCJR algorithm [26] used in classical turbo decod-
ing. By applying the symbol detection of the BCJR algo-
rithm using soft decision, the performance loss of the
sequence detection from hard decision can be reduced.
The trellis diagram of the FF code is presented in
Fig. 6.
Figure 6 describes the nth FF-decoded message uˆn value
0 (1) as a solid (dotted) line. When the decoding is per-
formed, the FF-decoded bit is correlated with all of the
incoming bits. It has a coding gain in the high SNR region
owing to the correlation property. Figure 7 presents the
BER and frame error rate (FER) of the proposed scheme
compared to the conventional scrambling scheme.
While the scrambling scheme only has error propa-
gation capability, the proposed FF code, with increased
minimum Hamming distance (dmin = 2) using redundant
bit (tail bit) and coding gain using the BCJR algorithm,
has a noticeable performance gain in the high SNR region.
In the low SNR region, this code demonstrates a BER of
0.5. Security as defined in this paper is achieved. More-
over, this code has an improved performance of about 0.4
dB compared to the uncoded system at the BER of 10−7,
owing to the BCJR decoding algorithm. Compared with
the conventional scrambling scheme, the proposed code
has a performance improvement of approximately 1.4 dB
at the BER of 10−7.
If information from other symbols with low reliability is
incorrect, errors accumulate for the entire code sequence,
which cause error propagation. Unlike channel errors, the
error positions after FF decoding (or descrambling) are
not exactly i.i.d. Moreover, the operation of the FF code
employs the correlation effect between consecutive sym-
bols and each symbol is dependent on other symbols.
Therefore, we cannot state that this system has a perfect
secrecy even though Eve’s BER is equal to 0.5. This does
not ensure the maximum entropy for Eve, since the error
positions are not i.i.d.
The security performance using security gap is pre-
sented in Fig. 8 and Table 1, where the number of trans-
mitted bits is 480, and Bob’s maximum BER, PBe,max, is
10−5. From the figure, we can observe that Eve’s BER con-
verges very slowly toward the ideal value of 0.5; hereafter,
PEe,min ≥ 0.4. Moreover, the security gap performances
at PEe,min ≥ 0.48 are almost the same. We will refer to
“PEe,min ≥ 0.4” as a sufficient amount of physical layer secu-
rity in this paper, but our schemes still apply to stricter
security thresholds (PEe,min = 0.5). Consider that when the
Eve’s minimum BER is PEe,min = 0.4, the uncoded scheme
(only BPSK {+1,−1}) requires a large (>20 dB) security
gap to achieve security performance. In the case of the
scrambling scheme, to achieve PEe,min = 0.4, only a 6.29
dB security gap is required. However, the proposed FF
code, unlike in the scrambling scheme, yields a security
gap gain of approximately 0.74 dB at PEe,min = 0.4 com-
pared to perfect scrambling. A security gap of only a 5.55
dB is required to achieve PEe,min = 0.4.
3.3 Complexity
One way to compare the complexity of the perfect scram-
bling and the pre-code (FF hard and soft decoding) is to
compare the type of operations and count the number of
times each operation is performed. The BCJR algorithm
of the pre-code involves the following operations:
• Forward/backward recursion: let t be the number of
states of the FF code, n be the number of the length
of a trellis, respectively. From the Fig. 7, each state
has two outgoing branches. For each state, (2t)
multiplication operations and t addition operation
are needed. Therefore, for a trellis with length n, a
Fig. 6 Trellis diagram corresponding to FF code with generator polynomial gFF(D) = 1 + D
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Fig. 7 BER and FER performance without forward error correction (s = 479 bits, tail bit 1, and k = n = 480 bits), in the presence of BPSK modulation,
perfect scrambling, and FF code
total of (2tn) multiplication operations and (tn)
addition operations are required. Likewise, the
operations required to backward recursion are also
equal to forward recursion.
• Branch metric (probability): to compute the branch
metric on the probability domain, (2t) branch
metrics are needed since there are t states and each
state has two outgoing branches. For each branch,
two multiplications are required. Therefore, a total of
(4tn) multiplications are needed for a trellis length n.
• LLR computation: the numerator (denominator) of
LLR computation is the total sum of the probability
of branch metric corresponding to 0 (1). Since the
pre-code has two states and two outgoing branches
per each state, there are four branch metrics of
probability domain. Among the metrics, two branch
metrics are corresponded to the probability of 0. For
each numerator and denominator, (t − 1) addition
operations are needed. Then, 1 logarithm operation
and 1 division operation are needed to compute LLR.
In total, 2(t − 1)n addition, n logarithm, and n
division operations are needed.
To compute the perfect scrambling scheme (randomly
generated), 1×n hard decision vector and n×n descram-
bling matrix are needed. For the 1st decoded (descram-
bled) bit, n multiplication operations and n − 1 addition
operations are needed. In total, n2 multiplication and
n(n − 1) addition operations are needed to obtain the
descrambled message.
The computational complexity could be decreased by
using G−1FF as perfect scrambling matrix (FF hard decod-
ing). In the previous section, we provide that the matrix
G−1FF guarantees the consideration of perfect scrambling.
From the Eq. (11), the sequence detection can be used.
Then, in total, only n − 1 addition operations are needed
to compute the descrambled message. The type of oper-
ations required by these algorithms (randomly generated
perfect scrambling, FF hard, soft decoding) and the num-
ber of times each operation is executed are summarized in
the Table 2.
From Table 2, it is possible to incorrectly evaluate
that the perfect scrambling scheme (random matrix) has
more complexity than the FF soft decoding, since it only
provides the types and numbers of operations for real
value computation. In terms of the hardware implemen-
tation, the perfect scrambling only uses binary operations
(modulo-2 operations); however, BCJR algorithm of FF
soft decoding requires the operations of the real val-
ues and it needs more cost per one operation than the
perfect scrambling. For those reasons, it is difficult to pre-
cisely compare the algorithms with the data in Table 2.
Therefore, the matrix G−1FF is used as perfect scrambling
for a fair comparison in this paper.
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Fig. 8 Security gap performance without forward error correction (s = 479 bits, tail bit 1, and k = n = 480 bits), in the presence of BPSK modulation,
perfect scrambling, and FF code
4 Joint iterative decoding for improved reliability
Joint iterative decoding (JID) in a concatenated system
has been used to achieve high reliability [27] in spite of
the high complexity. Since the proposed system is a seri-
ally concatenated structure, it is possible to use JID. In
addition, in Section III-B, we demonstrated that the FF
code has a coding gain through the use of a BCJR decod-
ing algorithm for a few (or single) errors, and thus the
performance gain from joint iterative decoding between
LDPC and FF codes can be predicted in terms of the
increasing SNR value. Figure 9 shows a schematic dia-
gram of the joint iterative decoding for LDPC and FF
concatenated system. The channel observations of k bit
information and n − k bit parity parts are ych,i and ych,p,
respectively. The extrinsic outputs of LDPC and FF codes
are E1 and E2, and the a priori knowledge of LDPC
and FF codes are A1 and A2, respectively. The dotted
square shows a message transfer node (MTN) that pro-
cesses the extrinsic information E1 and E2 to be a priori
knowledge, A1. The extrinsic output E2 without high
Table 1 Security gap performances with uncoded BPSK, perfect
scrambling and FF code over the AWGN channel
Code SNRE,max [dB] SNRB,min[dB] Sg [dB]
uncoded BPSK −14.94 9.59 24.53
Perf. scramb. 5.15 11.44 6.29
FF coded 4.25 9.8 5.55
reliability causes performance loss of LDPC decoding due
to its error propagation. To reduce the performance loss,
MTN uses the extrinsic output E1, which has higher reli-
ability than E2. In addition, MTN uses the correction
factor α and scaling factor β to minimize error propa-
gation by E2 at high SNR. We define the log-likelihood
ratio (LLR) as L(x) = ln(P(x = 1)/P(x = 0)).
li and lo are the number of LDPC decoding iterations and
LDPC-FF code joint iterations, which we call inner and
outer iterations, respectively.
When a decoder performs joint iterative decoding, the
initial incoming messages to the channel decoder are
given by:
L0(C1,i) = L(ych,i)
L0(C1,p) = L(ych,p) (12)
where L0(C1,i) and L0(C1,p) are the LLR values of infor-
mation and parity messages, respectively, when lo equals
Table 2 The types and numbers of operations needed to
implement the perfect scrambling (randomly generated), FF soft
decoding (BCJR), and FF hard decoding (as perfect scrambling)
Operations Perfect scrambling FF soft FF hard decoding
(randommatrix) (BCJR) (perfect scrambling)
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Fig. 9 Receiver structure of the joint iterative decoding for the
concatenated (LDPC decoder and pre-code decoder) system
zero (first iteration). Then, the updated messages (a priori
knowledge) from the FF decoder in the first iteration must
be set up to zero as:
L0(A1) = 0
After LDPC decoding, the extrinsic output E1 becomes
the a priori input A2. The FF decoder takes channel obser-
vations ych,i and a priori knowledge A2, and computes the
extrinsic output E2 as:
L0(C2) = L(ych,i) + L0(A2)
where L0(C2) is the input LLR values of the FF decoder at
the first iteration.
Therefore, the input message of the information part to
the channel decoder in the lo-th iteration, can be calcu-
lated recursively using
Ll0(C1,i) = L(ych,i) + Ll0−1(A1)
= L(ych,i) + α · Ll0−1(E1) + β · Ll0−1(E2)
(13)
Ll0(C2) = L(ych,i) + Ll0(A2)
= L(ych,i) + Ll0(E1) (14)
where α and β are the correction and scaling factors,
respectively.
4.1 Computing the correction and scaling factors via
Monte Carlo simulation
Both the α and β values are adopted to control the effect
of the extrinsic messages, E1 and E2. As mentioned above,
E2 has an error propagation property and causes perfor-
mance loss when it is used as a priori knowledge without
any corrections of LDPC code. The extrinsic output E1
used for correction of E2 can also cause performance loss
when LDPC output messages are taken as input mes-
sages because this would then oppose the general iterative
decoding rule. Thus, the correction factor α must be less
than one, 0 ≤ α < 1. Since LDPC code as FEC used in
this paper is linear, we can assume without loss of gener-
ality that the all-zero codeword is transmitted for a simple
analysis. For the FF decoder, channel error (L(ych,i) < 0)
or LDPC decoding failure (L(ych,i)+L(E1) < 0) can cause
error propagation. To reduce the loss by these impacts, the
correction factor α should be taken as
|L(ych,i)| ≥ α · |L(E1)|. (15)
For joint iterative decoding, we assume 10 inner itera-
tions (LDPC itr = li = 10) and the extrinsic message E1 is
the value after the inner iterations. To reduce the channel
error and decoding failure after the inner iterations, the
corrections factor α is chosen as
α =
{
|L(ych,i)L(E1) |, if |L(ych,i)| < |L(E1)|,
0.999999, otherwise.
(16)
The value of the scaling factor β is derived based on
α. Both α and β must be larger than zero and can take
the maximum value of one. The channel error or decod-
ing failure should be minimized by using the correction
and scaling factors with extrinsic messages E1 and E2,
respectively, so we have
L(ych,i) + α · L(E1) + β · L(E2) ≥ 0. (17)
Since we assume that all-zero codeword modulated into
x = +1 =[+1,+1, · · · ,+1] by BPSK {+1,−1} is transmit-
ted, the left-side of (17) must be larger than zero for the
next iteration without errors.









To achieve the suitable values of α and β for real LLR
values, we use Monte Carlo simulation for simplicity. We
use Monte Carlo simulation to achieve the correction and
scaling factors because error propagation property of FF
code depends on error positions and the estimation of
the error position is a difficult task. The inner and outer
iterations, li and lo are 10 and 1, respectively, and the
number of transmitted frames (trials) is 107. Figure 10
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Fig. 10 Patterns of correction factor α and scaling factor β at each SNR values for the proposed JID system
shows the obtained correction and scaling sequences via
Eqs. (16) and (18) at each SNR when li = 10 and lo = 1.
The figure shows how the correction and scaling factors
differ and how they change for different SNR values. By
observing the correction factor α and the scaling factor
β of the proposed JID scheme from Fig. 10, we can con-
clude that: (1) the correction factor α is generally smaller
than the scaling factor β for every SNR region, which
reflects the general iterative decoding rule; (2) the correc-
tion and scaling factor values reduce by increasing SNR
because error propagation effect should be reduced; (3)
as the value of SNR increases, the correction and scaling
factors will become smaller and finally converge to min-
imum values (α → 0.06, β → 0.08), which infers that
LDPC (FEC) decoding is becoming more reliable with the
increase of SNR value.
4.2 Extrinsic information transfer (EXIT) chart analysis
The EXIT chart [20–22] is a useful analysis tool of the
iterative decoding system. EXIT charts indicate mutual
information exchange between the extrinsic information
of two constituent codes. In most cases, the output LLR
messages of these codes can be assumed to follow the
Gaussian distribution. The extrinsic information between
the constituent codes can then be sequentially used to
process the computation. In this paper, the information
from the channel (intrinsic information) and the output
knowledge from the previous iteration (extrinsic informa-
tion) can be used as the input of the current iteration,
and the output of the current iteration can be used as
the input of the next iteration. We use LDPC code and
FF code as two constituent codes and assume that their
input and output LLR are approximated by the Gaussian
distribution.
Now suppose that IA is the average mutual information
between the coded bits and the a priori information, and
IE is the average mutual information between the coded
bits and the extrinsic output. Function T(IA,Eb/N0) = IE
is the EXIT chart function of the decoder and T(·) charac-
terizes the information transfer in the decoder. Denoting
the mutual information of the extrinsic information at the
output of LDPC and the FF code by IE1 and IE2 , and the
mutual information of the a priori information at the input
of LDPC and the FF code by IA1 and IA2 , respectively,
we have IE1 = T(IA1 ,Eb/N0) and IE2 = T(IA2 ,Eb/N0).
To obtain the EXIT curve, we assume that the input LLR
values, L(A1) and L(A2) are both symmetric. The sym-
metric conditions of LLR values are modeled as L(A1) ∼
N (m1, 2m1) and L(A2) ∼ N (m2, 2m2) such that m1 and
m2 are the mean of the L(A1) and L(A2)messages, respec-
tively. Therefore, the mutual information IA between X
and A can be written as IA = I(X;A) .= J(σA), as defined
in equation (12) in [28]. Similarly, the mutual information
IE = I(X;E) is defined as








2 · PE(z|X = x)
PE(z|X = −1) + PE(z|X = +1) dz. (19)
In general, an analytical evaluation of the mutual infor-
mation IE in Eq. (19) is a difficult task. For simplicity,
we use an approximated equation of the mutual infor-
mation. Following [28], Eq. (19) can be arbitrarily closely
approximated as
IE ≈ 1 − 1N
N∑
n=1
log2(1 + e−cn·L(cn)) (20)
where N is the number of samples, cn is the n-th code-
word, and L(cn) is the LLR value of the n-th codeword
such that cn ∈ {+1,−1}. Figures 11 and 12 show the
EXIT chart curve of the proposed system. In Fig. 11, the
EXIT curves between LDPC and FF codes without α and
β (α = 0, β = 0) are plotted. In this case, a pinch-off limit1
is finally at Eb/N0 = 2.62 dB. In Fig. 12, the EXIT curves
between LDPC and FF codes are plotted with the obtained
α and β in section IV-A. The pinch-off limit is then at
Eb/N0 = 2.26 dB. Asmentioned above, the FF code causes
the error propagation.Without the input sequence of high
reliability to the FF code, the error correction via the joint
iterative decoding cannot be expected. For its error cor-
rection capability, we need the suitable correction and
scaling factors.
4.3 Simulation results
In the previous subsections, it is suggested that the pro-
posed scheme needs the correction and scaling factors
in MTN for joint iterative decoding, and the joint itera-
tive decoding of the proposed system is evaluated through
EXIT chart curves. In this subsection, we evaluate the pro-
posed system through BER and security gap performance.
As noted in Fig. 10, the values of α and β are sensi-
tive functions of the signal-to-noise ratio. It may cause the
entire system to become very complex and lead to per-
formance loss when both values are wrongly evaluated.
Therefore, the simulation results for the fixed values are
also presented to avoid the impact of wrong evaluation.
The fixed values are selected in the SNR region having
the gain of the joint iterative decoding compared to the
perfect scrambling. The fixed values selected at low SNR
region (≤ 1.5 dB) may cause critical error propagation at
high SNR. In addition, the fixed values selected at high
SNR region (≥ 2.8 dB) render it difficult to achieve the
joint iterative decoding gain since the values are too small.
Based on these rules, the values are selected as α = 0.07
and β = 0.18, which are optimized at 2.4 dB. The rea-
sons for these values are as follows: (i) the JID at high SNR
Fig. 11 EXIT chart curves of joint FF and LDPC codes (without using the correction factor α and the scaling factor β)
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Fig. 12 EXIT chart curves of joint FF and LDPC codes using the proposed JID scheme (with optimal correction factor α and the scaling factor β)
region has some of iterative decoding gain compared to
the perfect scrambled LDPC code. For use of the fixed val-
ues, SNRB,min should possibly be kept as small as SNRB,min
for use of the optimized values. That is, despite the use
of the fixed values, outstanding reliability performance
should be achieved at high SNR region; ii) error propa-
gation effect is properly maintained at low SNR region
by using these values. That is, the SNRE,max for use of
the fixed values should be kept as close to the SNRE,max
as possible for use of the optimized values. These opti-
mized values shown in Fig. 12 are evaluated for the best
security performance at each SNR. Although the fixed val-
ues (α = 0.07, β = 0.18) are experimentally selected to
show the prevention of the wrong evaluation impact as
an example, the security performance will differ follow-
ing the values that are selected. In summary, these values
(α = 0.07, β = 0.18) are relevantly selected by consider-
ing error propagation at low SNR and error correction at
high SNR.
For comparison purposes, LDPC codes are consid-
ered to have the same parameters as those mentioned
in Section 3, k = 480 and n = 960. The secrecy
rate is Rs ≈ Rd = Rc = 0.5 and the BPSK modula-
tion {+1,−1} is used in our simulations. The maximum
LDPC iteration is 100. For the joint iterative decoding,
the number of inner and outer iterations, li and lo are
10 and 10, respectively. Figure 13 and Table 3 show the
BER performances of the systematic, perfect scrambled,
serially concatenated JID scheme throughMTNwith opti-
mized α and β , and the JID scheme with fixed α and
β values. From Fig. 13 and Table 3, it is observed that
the proposed concatenated and JID systems have perfor-
mance improvements of about 0.205 and 0.51 dB over the
perfect scrambling scheme in [16, 17] at a BER of 10−6.
We can observe that the joint iterative effect of the pro-
posed JID scheme eventually increases SNR, which is in
good agreement with the respective EXIT curve (pinch-off
limit) of Fig. 12. A performance improvement at high SNR
means that it can achieve a steep BER curve and a reduced
security gap.
The security gap performances for the various systems
are plotted in Fig. 14, while Table 3 shows the security gap
performances. Due to error floor phenomenon of LDPC
code, Bob’s maximum bit error probability PBe,max is set to
10−6, and the improved security of the proposed system
is thus more tangible. From Fig. 14 and Table 3, the secu-
rity gap performances of the JID system using MTN (with
optimized/fixed α and β) at PEe,min = 0.4 are about 2.26
and 2.37 dB. The security gap performance of the LDPC
and FF concatenation at PEe,min = 0.4 is about 2.615 dB. It
is observed that the proposed systems of serial concatena-
tion and JID using optimized α and β have performance
improvements of about 0.19 dB and 0.545 dB over the
perfect scrambling scheme, respectively. In the case of
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Fig. 13 BER performances versus the LDPC systematic, perfectly scrambled LDPC, LDPC and FF concatenated system (No joint iteration), and the
joint iterative decoding (inner iteration li = 10 and outer iteration lo = 10) between LDPC and FF decoders with values of the correction factor α
and the scaling factor β (Total LDPC iteration 100)
the JID scheme using MTN with the fixed α and β , the
performance improvement for the security gap is about
0.435 dB over the perfect scrambling scheme.
In conclusion, the SISO decoder of the FF code provides
a performance improvement over the scrambled scheme
and we can achieve a better performance improvement
using the proposed JID scheme. Furthermore, the pro-
posed system using the fixed factors has similar secu-
rity/reliability performances to that using the optimized
factors and can still achieve the performance improve-
ment over the scrambled scheme. From the figure, we can
also observe that the security gap advantage vanishes as
Eve’s BER tends toward the ideal value of 0.5, hereafter
Table 3 Security gap performances with systematic LDPC,
perfect scrambled LDPC, LDPC-FF serially concatenated (SC) and
LDPC-FF JID (opt./fix.) over the AWGN channel
Code SNRE,max [dB] SNRB,min[dB] Sg [dB]
Syst. −11.87 2.835 14.705
Perf. scramb. 0.685 3.49 2.805
SC 0.67 3.285 2.615
JID (opt.) 0.72 2.98 2.26
JID (fix.) 0.62 2.99 2.37
PEe,min ≥ 0.45. However, since PEe,min ≥ 0.4 is sufficiently
significant for a practical system, physical layer security as
defined in this paper can be achieved.
Although the proposed JID scheme has the advan-
tage of enhanced reliability/security performances, this is
achieved from an extra complexity/decoding delay. Basi-
cally, extra decoding complexity is needed since the FF
decoding procedure is performed lo times for JID. If more
JID is demanded, the extra complexity will be increased.
In [17], Baldi et al. demonstrated that physical layer
security can be achieved by using a very simple feed-back
mechanism based on Hybrid Automatic Repeat reQuest
(Hybrid ARQ or HARQ) when Bob’s channel is not “less
noisy" than Eve’s channel. They used the soft-combining
scheme of HARQ so that Bob can exploit a number of
transmissions Q < Qmax for decoding each frame and
Eve receives all retransmissions requested by Bob. Sim-
ilarly, we provide a simulation result on the use of the
HARQ scheme with the perfect scrambled LDPC and
the proposed FF-LDPC JID scheme using fixed factors.
The maximum number of transmissions is Qmax = 3.
The numerical results similar to that provided in [17]
are observed for HARQ with the proposed scheme. The
FER performances with HARQ (soft-combining) for the
perfect scrambled LDPC and the proposed JID scheme
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Fig. 14 Security gap performances versus the LDPC systematic, perfectly scrambled LDPC, LDPC and FF concatenated system (No joint iteration),
and the joint iterative decoding (inner iteration li = 10 and outer iteration lo = 10) between LDPC and FF decoders with values of the correction
factor α and the scaling factor β (total LDPC iteration 100)
are plotted in Fig. 15. From the figure, the FER perfor-
mances of the perfect scrambled LDPC and the proposed
JID scheme are the dotted and solid lines, respectively.
The fluctuations are observed in the figure because an
average number of transmissions is a decreasing func-
tion for Bob’s received SNR. Also, in this case, we could
observe the improved reliability of the proposed JID
scheme for each result. The error correction capability
of the proposed scheme could be improved, while the
correction capability of the scrambled scheme depends
only on LDPC code. Hence, the proposed JID scheme
allows us to achieve the desired level of physical layer
security.
4.4 Randomness measurement
The proposed precode includes operations between con-
secutive symbols. From these operations, the proposed
precode has a correlation effect and is able to employ
soft decision decoding. Due to the correlation effect and
soft decision decoding, Eve’s decoding performance is
better than that of the perfect scrambling scheme. How-
ever, the security gap between Bob and Eve is maintained
since both performances are equally enhanced. The pro-
posed scheme may have a negative impact on the ran-
domness of the produced sequence since the FF code
is highly structured. For this reason, the entire distribu-
tion of errors should be analyzed since Eve’s average error
rate does not guarantee the randomness of the decoded
sequence.
From Fig. 3, Eve’s received Z decodes LDPC decoded
message MˆE = M + E by using the BP decoder, where
M and E are LDPC codeword and the error vector after
LDPC decoding, respectively. In addition, through the FF
decoder, Eve’s FF decoder outputs the FF decoded mes-
sage UˆE = U + e, where U and e are the information
message and error vector after FF decoding, respectively.
For the erroneous frame, let eli be the number of errors for
the ith position in the l-th erroneous frame, lmax be the
total number of erroneous frames, ti be the total number
of errors at the ith position, ti = ∑lmaxl=1 eli, and T be the
total number of errors, T = ∑ni=1 ti, where n is the length
of the information bits. Therefore, the error expectation
value (or bit error probability) at the i-th position for an
erroneous frame is Pim = ti/lmax. Therefore, Pim is the bit
error probability for each position when e 
= 0.
Figure 16 shows the results of randomness measure-
ment (the entire distribution of errors) of the final
decoded message UˆE with errors for the perfectly scram-
bled LDPC and the proposed JID scheme. In the case
of the perfectly scrambled LDPC, error positions after
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Fig. 15 The FER performances versus Bob’s SNR for the perfect scrambled LDPC (dotted line) and the proposed FF-LDPC JID (solid line) using the
fixed factors (α = 0.07, β = 0.18) with soft-combining HARQ (Qmax = 3) and different values of security gap (Sg)
descrambling are randomly distributed since the descram-
bling matrix is randomly generated with the density of 0.5.
Uniform error distribution is observed for every position,
even though error positions are not i.i.d. In the case of the
LDPC-FF JID, Pim at the front and tail parts has relatively
low values since the FF decoder employs BCJR algorithm
which is set up with a high probability for the zero state
at the first and last step. However, even in the high SNR
region, the randomness is kept to Pim ≈ 0.5 for the posi-
tions of most of the parts, except a few of the front and
last positions. In other words, when Eve uses the same
decoder as that used by Bob, she cannot extract any useful
information since error positions of the proposed scheme
are as randomly distributed as the perfectly scrambled
scheme for most of the parts. Because Pim ≥ 0.4 means
that the error probability over 0.4 has fairly high uncer-
tainty at the ith position (we cannot state about entropy
since error positions are not independent).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined security-processing
schemes for physical layer security. We proposed a seri-
ally concatenated system that consists of an outer code
and conventional FEC as an inner code. Compared with
previous works relating to channel coding for physical
layer security, the puncturing scheme for LDPC code
(or linear block code) has a weakness in that it should
be required higher signal power to achieve reliability
than scrambling scheme. The disadvantages of the scram-
bling scheme as unitary rate coding are that it is only
capable of reducing the security gap and it does not
provide the error correction capability. The proposed
security scheme adopts the FF code using a SISO decod-
ing procedure (BCJR algorithm). We demonstrated that
the proposed scheme is capable of performing error cor-
rection and error propagation simultaneously. Simulation
results confirm that the FF code using a BCJR algorithm
has an improved reliability performance and reduced
security gap.
Furthermore, we proposed a joint iterative decoding
algorithm between the FF code and conventional LDPC
to improve the reliability performance through the bit
and frame error rate with a correction factor α and
scaling factor β obtained by using Monte Carlo simu-
lation. These factors are the functions of the signal-to-
noise ratio. In the case of the proposed JID using these
factors, our best results indicate reliability/security-gap
performance improvements of 0.51 and 0.545 dB, respec-
tively. The reliability performance of the proposed JID
scheme using these factors is observed to be only 0.145
dB away from the systematic LDPC code. Despite the use
of fixed factors to avoid the impact of wrong evaluation,
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Fig. 16 The results of randomness measurement using the perfectly scrambled LDPC and the proposed JID scheme at 0 and 2 dB region
our results indicate reliability/security-gap performance
improvements to perfect scrambled LDPC of 0.5 and
0.435 dB, respectively. It is demonstrated that error floor
phenomenon of LDPC code in the high SNR region can
be reduced when using joint iterative decoding with the
proper α and β ; thus, a reduced security gap can be
achieved. This is analyzed via the EXIT chart curve.
In future works, equivocation rate analysis of the pro-
posed scheme will be performed with α and β for an
information-theoretic approach.
Endnote
1pinch-off limit means that both transfer characteristics
of two constituent codes are just about to intersect (see
[20, 21]).
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